At that time Arthur Okun was one of many who believed that the business cycle pattern had become obsolete.
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In the 1980s, however, two-digit levels of unemploy ment were back in many countries, and are now increasingly seen as normal by social scientists as well as others.
The presence of these world-wide, large and unexpected swings in unemployment rates makes the labour market a central area for the testing of competing hypotheses on policy making in West ern societies. Economic explanations centred on the dysfunctioning of markets compete with po litical, conflict oriented interpretations that ac cord purposive political action a significant role. Thus in analyses of the causes of the dramatic in creases in umemployment since the early 1970s, the clearly dominant approach, followed by a ma jority of economists, is focused on the supply side, on the dysfunctioning of labour markets as a result of outside interference with market mecha nism. Although demand factors are accorded some role here, the drastic increases in raw mate rial prices following the oil shocks and processes inhibiting necessary adjustments in the price of labour, i. e. wages, are generally seen as the cen tral ones. A contrasting political approach views unemployment as a reflection of conflicts be tween different interest groups. This view is held by a minority, mostly political scientists and so ciologists, who have debated to what extent parti san politics have mattered for policy making in relation to unemployment and also discussed the role of labour market institutions and patterns of policy making in this context. 4 The purpose of this article is to attempt to ad judicate between the above competing interpreta tions of the causes of unemployment in Western democracies. To get a fresh perspective on the causes of unemployment, I shall here focus on the two great transformations of Western unemploy ment levels -the general decrease of unemploy ment, during the early post-war years and the widespread and drastic increases in unemploy ment after 1973. The analysis of these two turning points of the long waves of unemployment brings into the open often overlooked variations in un employment rates in different countries during the Golden Age as well as during the crises since 1973. A key part of the empirical testing consists in determining whether the causal processes that in our hypothesis are believed to underlie the turning points of the long waves can also account for the remaining variations in unemployment in the different countries. This comparative, longterm approach offers us the opportunity to learn from the 'natural' but uncontrolled experiments in policy making that have been carried out in dif ferent countries sharing basic similarities. So it gives an effective base for testing competing theo retical approaches. The study includes eighteenIt has been claimed that in several Western na tions excessive real wages were a major cause of the increases in unemployment after 1973. 9 Possibly, however, the conclusion drawn by some economists and the OECD that unwarrant ed increases in real wages are a main cause of the rise in unemployment after 1973 is based on a misleading specification of the model to be test ed. This is because the type of specification used in this context typically constrains the coefficients of _real wages, terms of trade and productivity growth to be identical by combining them into an index of the real wage gap. But if the different components of this index have differing effects on unemployment, such a specification may lead to erroneous interpretations.
I shall therefore test the supply shock and real wage gap hypothesis on the basis of data for the period 1960 to 1986 for eighteen countries. I be gin by replicating the basic specification in previ ous research, where unemployment is regressed upon the real wage gap. The wage gap measure is the one developed by the OECD.
10 It reflects the difference between, on the one hand, actual in creases in real compensation for employees as well as non-wage labour costs and, on the other hand, the 'warranted' level of wage increases defind as the sum of productivity increases and ef fects of changes in the terms of trade on national income (see the Appendix for details on variables and data sources). I shall also test a second speci fication where on the right-hand side the wage gap indicator is complemented by separate mea sures of changes in the terms of trade and produc tivity, the coefficients of which are allowed to vary freely. In this second specification, an in dicator of changes in the world economic climate which may affect labour market performance is also introduced. This control variable is 'world unemployment', defined for each country as av erage unemployment in the other seventeen countries of the sample (weighted by the size of the labour force) and thus excluding the country under consideration.
In each of the eighteen countries the supply shock and real wage hypothesis is thus tested through two alternative specifications of timeseries equations for the period 1960-86, the first of which is of the type used by Bruno and Sachs:" AU, = a" + a,AGAP,. ; + e (1) AU, = a" + a, A GAP,., + a 2 APROD,., + a 3 ATOT,., + a 4 A WU, + e
where U = unemployment rate PROD = productivity (defined as real GDP per person employed) TOT = terms of trade (reflecting relative import and export prices) GAP = real wage gap = (real wage + non-wage labour costs) -(productivity + terms of trade ef fect) (see Appendix) WU = world unemployment in the other seven teen countries AU, = U, -U,., etc.
According to the supply shock and real wage hy pothesis, the signs of the coefficients for real wage gaps are expected to be positive while those for productivity and terms of trade should be neg ative. The sign of the coefficients for world unem ployment are expected to be positive. To de crease possible simultaneous effects of unemploy ment on wages and productivity, effects of changes in wage gaps and in productivity as well in terms of trade have here been lagged by one year. Two-year lags have also been tested but yield less clear results. Effects of world unem ployment are, however, assumed to be simultane ous. The specification Equation 1 differs somewhat from that of Bruno and Sachs, who used a lagged dependent variable and a time trend. The first difference specification is preferred here because it decreases the influence of unmeasured factors causing time trends and avoids the difficulties of using a lagged dependent variable. I have also tested the lagged specifications and they yield re sults similar to those presented below.
The results of the estimation of Equation 1 above indicate why scholars using the type of specification where the effects of changes in pro ductivity, terms of trade and real labour costs are constrained to be identical have come to the con clusion that the real wage gap is of crucial impor tance for the development of unemployment (see Table 1 ). In all but two countries (Austria and Norway) the coefficient for the wage gap indica tor has the expected positive sign and it is statisti cally significant in seven of them -Australia, Bel gium, Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom.
But when the wage gap measure is comple mented by indicators of changes in the terms of trade and in productivity, which are allowed to vary freely, the results change drastically. The coefficient for the wage gap is now significant in AU, = a" + a,A GAP,., 2 AU, = a" + a,A GAP,., + a 2 A PROD,., + a 3 A TOT,., + a"A WU, Significance levels (one-tail) of t-statistics * =S 0.05 ** =£ 0.01 *** =S 0.001 Sources: see the Appendix.
only two countries (Belgium and Finland) and has an unexpected negative sign in five of them. Changes in the terms of trade also appear to have been of minor importance for increases in unem ployment, having only four significant coeffi cients and unexpected positive signs in one-third of the countries. Instead, productivity changes come out as the main determinant of increasing unemployment, having sixteen expected negative coefficients, eleven of which are significant. The indicator of world unemployment also has consid erable predictive power with sixteen coefficients having the expected positive sign, nine of them significant. The analyses here show, therefore, that al though in some countries high real wages may have been of some importance for increasing un employment, the central role accorded to the wage factor in discussions of unemployment in the OECD countries since 1973 cannot be sup ported by empirical data. The previously fa voured specifications, which have constrained the effects of changes in real labour costs to be identi cal with those of changes in productivity and the terms of trade and have not been tested for the in-dependent effects of the latter two variables, have generated a misleading interpretation of the role of wages in this context. In these previous specifi cations what in fact are primarily effects of chang es in productivity and in the terms of trade are er roneously credited to changes in wage gaps.
In the respecifications suggested here changes in productivity turn out to be the most important factor. The association between declines in pro ductivity and increasing unemployment is, how ever, a very problematic one for causal interpre tation. It has for instance, been argued that by hitting the least productive workers and firms first, recessions tend to increase the efficiency of the remaining parts of the economy. However, recessions are also likely to produce a slowdown in the growth of productivity because for exam ple, economies of scale, capacity utilization and improvements in human capital can all decline, because labour hoarding increases and because resources are not reallocated between sectors as efficiently.
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In almost all of our countries the de cline in productivity starts in 1973-74, that is with the severe international recession. Therefore it appears reasonable to view the association be tween declines in productivity increasing unem ployment as a spurious one, reflecting the onset of the economic crisis.
The real wage gap indicator can be expected to reflect the direct or indirect effects of different important supply-side factors that tend to in crease real wage rigidity, such as the extent of unionization and social security provisions. How ever, it is obviously at best only an imperfect in dicator of other supply-side factors.
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Yet al though the oil shocks of the 1970s undoubtedly presented a serious disturbance to Western econ omies, economic factors alone apparently cannot explain the development of unemployment in these countries. Thus, for example, Japan and Sweden were obviously as severely hit by the oil crises as Germany and Belgium, but the labour market performance was much worse in the latter two countries. Because of North Sea oil the Unit ed Kingdom was not negatively affected by in creasing oil prices after the second oil shock but its unemployment levels rose considerably that time. So it appears that an analysis of unemploy ment from a conflict-of-interest perspective and a discussion of the role of political factors in this context would be fruitful.
Conflicts of interest and the politics of unemploy ment
Apart from the insider-outsider theory, contem porary economists largely disregard conflicts of interest in the explanation of unemployment. Some of their predecessors, however, accorded conflicts of interest between businesses and their employees a central place in the generation of un employment. Thus, for example, according to Kalecki, 'the assumption that a government will maintain full employment in a capitalist economy if it only knows how to do it is fallacious'.
14 As is well known, Kalecki argued that business inter ests needed the economic insecurity generated by unemployment to keep wages low and to main tain discipline on the shop floor. Equally impor tant, as long as the level of employment is de pendent on the degree of confidence of business leaders in the government, these interests have a powerful indirect control over government policy.
In contrast to neo-classical economics, a basic assumption of much political analysis of policy making is the existence of conflicts of interest be tween different groups or collectivities in Western societies. In such analyses economic conditions enter as constraints for and frameworks within which political strategies are developed and gov ernment policy making takes place. From this perspective, then, conflicts of interest based on the social stratification system and centred around distributive issues play a key role in policy making.
A conflict-of-interest approach to the explana tion of unemployment can be grounded in an analysis of the nature and distribution of power resources between different socio-economi inter est groups in Western democracies." In modern Western societies, two main types of power re sources -economic and political -are central. Economic power resources (including capital), which typically are used in the context of mar kets, are generally unequally distributed among citizens and socio-economically defined interest groups. In contrast political power resources, such as the capacity to organize for collective ac tion and, in democracies, to exert influence though voting, are much less unequally distrib uted among these groups. The fact that in West ern societies economic power resources are clear ly correlated with the class and stratification sys tem, while political power resources are more widely dispersed, is likely to generate a tension between markets and politics. Free-riding prob-lems apart, citizens with few economic resources will find it rational to act collectively in order to use their relative advantage in political resources to set conditions for, and to modify, the outcomes of distributive processes on the markets. Because of the macro-level consequences of unemployment discussed above, but also because the direct costs of unemployment fall primarily on categories of individuals who are relatively weak in terms of market resources, policy making affecting unemployment can be assumed to be a conflictual area in the sense that in the ranking of policy priorities, different interest groups are likely to give full employment policies differing ranks. This part of the conflict-of-interest or po litical hypothesis about unemployment receives some support in earlier works. Thus an analysis of legislative proposals, technical documents and reports of political parties in nine Western coun tries in 1960 indicates that the priorities of politi cal parties differed in the predicted ways. Full employment tended to be the dominant objective for left parties but not for centrist and conserva tive parties, which instead gave the first priority to price stability.'
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In the power resources perspective unemploy ment is thus seen as the labour market expression of distributive conflicts, i. e. as an outcome of conflicts and distributive struggles between socio economic groups mediated via partisan politics and taking place under economic, institutional and other constraints. To the extent that left-wing political parties are based in and reflect the in terests of relatively disadvantages groups and col lectivities in the socio-economic stratification sys tems of Western nations, they will play a key role in these conflicts. However, we should not expect a simple causal relationship between left-wing strength and unemployment. In this context var iations in left-wing strength can instead be as sumed to affect the strategies of all the main po litical actors and thus to affect unemployment in directly. The alternative political or conflictof-interest hypothesis thus expects variations in unemployment to reflect settlements of distributive conflicts and predicts that, given the degree of eco nomic and other constraints, an increase in the rel ative strength of the left is likely to have conse quences for the strategies of the main political par ties and, indirectly or directly, for the level of unemployment.
The testing of the conflict-of-interest hypothe sis on the political background to variations in un employment is a more complicated matter than is often assumed and differs from the tests of the ef fects of economic factors. Economic theory as sumes that supply shocks work their way through the anonymous processes of the markets and that their effects can therefore be tested via causal analysis and regression models of the type used above. In political analysis we must, however, al so consider the strategic choices of political ac tors. To test the effects of political factors we must rely on intentional as well as on causal anal ysis. 17 This difference is often not_pbserved so em pirical attempts to determine whether partisan politics matters in policy making generally use a causal approach and correlate or regress policy outcomes on government composition. This type of approach implies that the political process is made up of 'transmission belts', where different groups articulate their interests and, if they are successful, put them into effect via control over government policy. While this approach is rele vant it suffers from at least four limitations.
First, such a simple causal model overlooks the role of strategic, intentional action by govern ment elites. It neglects the possibility that chang es in party competition may induce government elites to implement not their own preferred pol icies but instead a policy which is advocated by their political competitors and which they per ceive as highly appealing to the electorate. Thus, if election outcomes indicate increasing support for the full employment alternative, the strategic incentives facing party leaders in the competition between parties may also lead centrist and con servative governments to accept and to carry out such policies.
Secondly, economic theories of voting assume that party choice by voters is determined by dif ferences in their past or future, real or hypotheti cal, utility income (i.e. flows of benefits) from the policies of competing government alterna tives.' 8 This assumption is incomplete, however. In addition to such utility at least two other cir cumstances surrounding policy making will affect the choice of voters and must be systematically taken into account. These are the availability of realistic policy tools to achieve a policy goal and the presence of a credible alternative government willing to use such tools. The degree of utility or the desirability of a policy alternative will matter primarily when a voter believes that it can be put into practice and that at least one of the parties contending for government is capable of doing this. Perceived realism and credibility are affected by voters' experiences of policy outcomes but al-so by inventions of new policies, such as Keynesianism.
Thirdly, institutional and other types of con straints on the choice of government policy must be systematically considered. Given the distribu tion of political support for the government, basic institutional structures such as constitutions which allow minority parties to block political de cision making, but also more ephemeral ones such as the degree of centralization of collective bargaining, may facilitate or generate certain types of policies while discouraging others.
Fourthly, in the long run policy choices may in fluence institutional structures and thus affect conditions for their own continuation. This means that we must also consider feedback ef fects of policy making on institutions, power structures and modes of conflict regulation.
For the above reasons the political hypothesis about the determinants of unemployment cannot be formulated or tested only in terms of the ef fects of left-wing government participation on the level of unemployment. We have to consider the presence of long-term policy strategies and their institutional underpinnings in addition to shortterm variations in government composition.
Recent causal studies of the effects of govern ment changes on unemployment in a number of Western countries give qualified support to the 'trans-mission-belt' version of the political hy pothesis. Decreases in unemployment after the coming to power of left-wing governments have indeed been found to depend on whether or not unemployment was a major issue in the election campaign and may be limited to the early part of a left-wing government's term.
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A detailed causal analysis of the short-term ef fects of changes in government composition on unemployment cannot be undertaken here. In stead I shall complement this type of research by considering the possible effects of strategic politi cal action on the turning points of the long waves of unemployment. Because of data limitations such processes are difficult to test via regression techniques and we have to use less elegant and more cumbersome methods, relying on qualita tive as well as on quantitative empirical informa tion. I propose to extend the time horizon of the analysis and to try to understand the two great transformations of unemployment levels in terms of strategic policy choices by governing elites. In both cases the analyses of the background to these turning points of the long waves of unem ployment are complemented by analyses of the remaining variations in levels of unemployment in the different countries in order to test whether the causal mechanisms assumed to generate the general turning points can account also for the re maining variation among countries.
From the Great Depression to the Golden Age
The nearly full level of employment during the Golden Age, which strikingly deviates from the more or less normal pattern of high unemploy ment up to the 1930s, is widely interpreted as the result of rapid economic growth generated by fac tors such as faster technical progress, liberaliza tion of trade barriers, an abundant labour supply, demand generated by reconstruction after the Second World War and stable exchange rates. However, in line with the alternative political or conflict-of-interests hypothesis, Andrea Boltho has argued that the increased influence of govern ment macroeconomic policy activism was a major factor behind the economic stability during the early post-war decades. Earlier, Andrew Schonfield pointed out 'the conscious pursuit of full em ployment' by governments as a crucial factor be hind this exceptional situation and at the central role of 'political will and skill' for the achieve ment of full employment.
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The conflict-of-interest approach to the under standing of the low unemployment rates during the Golden Age suggests that to a large extent this was the result of a political strategy generated in the new conditions for party competition that were present in the years following the end of the Second World War. A crucial part of this new context was the generally increased strength of left-wing parties and labour movements as well as the improved credibility of their traditional full employment policy alternatives. Thus although in some countries left-wing parties had entered gov ernment even before 1939, the period following the Second World War was the first in the history of most Western states when left-wing parties emerged as major government alternatives. Com pared with the inter-war period, the average elec toral support for left-wing parties in our eighteen countries increased strongly during the post-war decades, unionization was doubled and the extent of left-wing government participation more than doubled (see Table 2 a, b and c). In addition, Keynesian ideas now provided a policy tool, which it was widely assumed would make it pos sible to create and maintain full employment. Furthermore, experiences of wartime full em- Eighteen OECD Countries 1900 . (Period Averages.) 1900 -1913 1920 -1938 1950 -1973 1974 ployment were still fresh in the memories of vot ers and showed that full employment was a real istic policy alternative.
The above circumstances suggest the interpre tation that while centrist and conservative parties tended to give priority to price stability over full employment during the post-war years, their con scious pursuit of full employment while in gov ernment reflected strategic, pre-emptive action generated through what Maurice Duverger once called a 'contagion from the left'.
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This political contagion occurred where centrist and conserva tive governments perceived that full employment policies were seen as desirable and realistic policy options by crucial sectors of the electorate.
To what extent can the economic and political hypotheses of the background to full employment during the Golden Age help to explain often overlooked variations in levels of unemployment among Western countries during this period? We shall make a crude test of the above hypothesis by relating economic growth and inflation rates as well as the political situation in the different countries to their levels of unemployment during this period.
The economic hypothesis, which assumes that the various factors favouring economic growth al so generated full employment, is not consistent with the data. As Table 3 indicates, the four countries with exceptionally high unemployment -the United States, Canada, Italy and Irelandhave had about the same average annual rates of economic growth (3-7 per cent) during the 1960-73 period as the fourteen countries with low unemployment (3-9 per cent). Neither do the countries with high unemployment appear to have suffered more from an inflation constraint on full employment policies than the other coun tries. Their average annual increase in consumer prices (4-3 per cent) was not higher than in the low unemployment countries (4-7 per cent). These four countries do not appear to have shared economic constraints which made their unemployment rates deviate clearly from those of the full employment countries. In party competition, the 'contagiousness' of the Left depends on the extent of its credibility as a government alternative, something which re flects the longterm experiences of the electorate. These long-term experiences up to the time when our countries entered the 1960-73 period will here be roughly summarized by averaging the ranking of the eighteen countries in terms of two indicators -the average percentage of votes for left-wing parties during the period 1919-59, and the proportion of the time from 1919 to 1959 that left-wing parties participated in government.
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The average rank of the countries on the above two indicators is taken to show thè extent to which the political Left was likely to be seen by the electorate as a realistic and desirable government alternative around 1960. When we relate this rank to average levels of unemployment during the 1960-73 period, we find a 'threshold level' of left-wing strength below which party competition and left-wing contagion with respect to full employment policy did not take place (see Table  3 ). In the four high unemployment countries (and in Japan) the left-wing political alternative was weaker and less credible than in the countries with low unemployment. Thus, as is well known, the United States never had a socialist party of major significande and this was by and large also true of Canada. The Irish Labour party was small and relatively insignificant in a party system originating in different strands of political opinion on the question of national independence. In Italy the Left had been repressed during the long period of Fascist rule. After the war the Left's share of votes was relatively high, actually somewhat higher than in Germany, the political historiy of which to some extent resembles that of Italy. But the Italian Left was dominated by a Communist party, the democratic credentials of which were widely denied, a factor which undercut its credibility as a government alternative. While the Germans had experienced governments led by a fairly strong reformist socialist party before the Nazi period, the Italians hade only known left-wing participation in coalition governments during the exceptional years of 1944-48. In Switzerland and the Netherlands social democratic parties had participated in long-term coalition governments. France also had a history of Left-led governments before as well as during the years after the Second World War. In the other full employment countries, the left-wing parties were even stronger political actors.
The above circumstances are thus consistent with the political hypothesis that during the first post-war decades, where a relatively strong leftwing party was seen as a realistic government alternative, party competition stimulated strategic, pre-emptive action also by centrist and conservative governments in pursuit of full employment policies although full employment probably was not the first priority of these parties. In the few countries where the left-wing alternative lacked credibility, in spite of the world-wide boom period during the Golden Age, unemployment levels were retained at relatively high levels. Thus, for example, in the United States, a coalition of business and agrarian interests defeated the Full Employment Bill in 1945, and thereafter full employment was not a political top priority. 23 In this context, however, Japan is an exception and will be discussed below. Is there any relationship between these increas es in inflation rates and changes in the shape of industrial conflict? The link connecting them is the fact that wage bargaining between employers and employees only concerns nominal wages while inflation determines real wages. Up to the Second World War, however, in the absence of rapid inflation wage settlements largely deter mined real wages. Industrial disputes were, there fore, generally long, fought by both parties to the bitter end. During the inter-war period, however, changes such as the general abandonment of the gold standard made it much easier to manipulate the value of paper money. My interpretation is that since the inter-war period, inflation has grad ually become a complement and partial alterna tive to industrial disputes for settling distributive conflicts.
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During the post-war period, wage ne gotiations have therefore gradually turned into first-round skirmishes on the determination of nominal wages. Employers have often been able to withdraw rather quickly from costly industrial disputes to the second round, the raising of prod uct prices and thus the determination of real wag es.
The shifting role of industrial disputes, infla tion and unemployment in distributive conflicts appears to be related to changes in the distribu tion of power resources in the Western nations. As indicated above, in a historical perspective the Golden Age of the post-war years stands out as a period during which the position of wage earners in distributive conflicts was stronger than ever be fore. Increased organizational capacity in unions and left-wing political parties, as well as the gen erally high demand for labour, contributed to strengthening their position. As a result the func tional distribution of income was changed in their favour, with the share of wages showing an in creasing trend and profits becoming squeezed. During in 1960s many governments in the OECD countries thus came to view wage infla tion and the profit squeeze as increasingly serious problems. Yet up to the early 1970s, the changing functional distribution of income was grudgingly accepted and full employment continued to be given top priority, probably largely because of the fear that a serious recession would have elec toral repercussions. Incomes policies were tried as a way to keep wage increases within limits, but with meagre success. It is hardly surprising that in this situation several governments came to con sider other alternatives. In 1970 the OECD pro duced an important policy document, Inflation: The Present Problem, which illustrates the views of influential policy makers in the years before the first oil shock. This policy statement, publish ed well before the oil crisis, comes surprisingly close to recommending unemployment as a cure to inflation and the profit squeeze, and is there fore worth detailed consideration.
In arguing for 'the urgent need to give higher priority to price stability', the OECD made the key observation that 'the problem of inflation arises in. part from the very successes of post-war economic policies in other directions -notably in achieving high levels of employment'. Further more, the OECD recognized that 'giving higher priority to price stability means giving lower pri ority to something else' and that 'in a number of countries this may temporarily have to be' growth and employment. The first recommendation of the OECD for restoring price stability included the statement that 'excess demand should be eliminated and governments should be prepared, where necessary, to accept a temporary reduction in the rate of activity until there are signs that bet ter price stability has been achieved'.
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In its cautious discussion of the proposal to rec reate 'the fear of a real recession' as a cure for in flation, the OECD regarded the negative politi cal reactions to such a policy as a major obstacle. 'Today a serious recession would be clearly recog nized to be the result of a deliberate policy being followed by the government', while in the 1930s 'it could be thought that this was the result of a natural disaster'. Therefore, 'the fundamental problem is how to get people to exercise the mod eration that they would do if they believed that a major recession was possible, without actually having to administer the lesson'.
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The first oil shock hit the Western nations like a natural disaster. OPEC became the catalyst-in the administration of the lesson of increasing un employment, which under these circumstances was not perceived primarily as a result of deliber ate government policy. An interpretation close at hand is that the relatively mild political reactions to increasing unemployment strengthened the courage of many policy makers. As Rehn puts it: 'It is possible that the sudden increase in unem ployment after the first oil price jump in 1973 was not planned by governments. But when it oc curred, they were pleased to see that unemploy ment was not as dangerous politically as many had thought'.
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Again the OECD urged caution with expansive policies and argued that it was better to accept 'a less rapid reduction of unem ployment now, in order to achieve lower levels of unemployment later on'.
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The conflict-of-interest or political hypothesis thus suggests that the post-1973 resurgence of un employment to a considerable extent was a result of strategic choice by governments. The new in ternational economic situation initiated by the OPEC decreased the electoral risks of allowing unemployment to increase and tempted many governments into using unemployment as a cure for inflation, the profit squeeze, and political un rest. This political interpretation would be streng thened if it can be demonstrated that differences in power distributions between countries tended to modify strategic action of government elites and thereby labour market performance after 1973. To analyse this issue we shall have to look at differences in power relations between major Political and Economic ... 113 interest groups in these countries as they entered the period of crisis and the patterns of conflict strategies that they generated. Societal bargaining can also be induced, how ever, in situations where the Left is relatively weak but where basic institutional factors, such as the form of the constitution, give minority groups a pivotal role in political decision making. In two -but only in two -of our countries, Switzerland and Finland, constitutions give something ap proaching veto power to relatively small parties. The Swiss constitution, which allows small in terest groups to introduce referendums and thus renders the decision-making process cumber some and uncertain, drives the conservative and liberal parties as well as business interests also to bring the relatively small Social Democratic party and the rather weak unions into formal and in formal negotiations before decisions are taken and to accept a minority representation of Social Democrats in the Bundesrat.
Societal bargaining, pluralism and state-led cap italism
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The Finnish con stitution, which requires qualified majorities in the Eduskunta for significant legislation to be come valid for more than one year, favours broad coalition governments. In the late 1960s some of the severe splits within the Finnish labour move ment were overcome, something which generated a change in the mode of conflict regulation in the direction of societal bargaining. Since the early 1970s and up to 1991 Finland has thus had stable Social Democratic minority representation in dif ferent coalition governments and long periods of income policies with state involvement.
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In the remaining countries, according to our in dicators, the Left has been either weak or of me dium strength with at most only temporary gov ernment participation. The dominant or normal mode of regulation of interest group conflict in these countries is a pattern which we can term pluralism. Important characteristics of the plural ist mode are that no enduring understanding is reached between the dominant forces represent ing business interests and wage-earners and that conflicts of interest are handled more as zero-sum than as positive-sum situations. To some extent, however, the outcome of policy making under pluralism is expected to reflect variations in the relative strength of the Left and the unions.
In taking accounty of qualitative as well as quantitative data, most comparativists appear to agree that in terms of the pattern of economic policy making, Japan differs from Europe and North America in significant ways. The mode of economic policy making in Japan has been termed 'state-led capitalism' and involves close co-operation between elites in the state and in the business sector with only a marginal participation by weak and divided labour unions and left-wing parties. 34 It is rarely noted, however, that the Ja panese pattern of policy making can be seen as an application of a mode of regulation of class and interest group conflicts, which has an intellectual pedigree going back to the time of Bismarck. Central to this mode is a reliance on the classical corporatist strategy to deter the organization of interests among citizens on the basis of class and to hinder broadly-based collective action through measures designed to divide and to segment em ployees on the bases of occupation and/or en terprise. Thus corporatism, in the original sense of the term, encouraged the segmented integra tion between employers and employees within enterprises and industries.
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The state elites be hind the Meiji restoration and the ensuing mod ernization of the Japanese economy were directly influenced by Bismarckian conservative, corpo ratist ideas.
36 When adapted to the Japanese sit uation, the big enterprises became centres for vertical integration and horizontal segmentation.
Since the post-war reconstruction with the challenge from the Left being subdued in the early 1950s, elites in the business sector as well as in the state bureaucracy and the dominant Liber al Democratic party have co-operated closely to bring about a state-led capitalism, where employ ees are segmented according to the size of en terprise and the nature of their contracts of em ployment, permanent workers in the big enter prises being especially favoured. Statistical artefacts can probably partly explain the very low levels of unemployment reported in Japan, espe cially during the early post-war years.
3 ' However, the avoidance of mass unemployment during the first post-war decades appears to have been a price which the conservative ledarship in business as well as in politics was willing to pay for a seg mented, malleable, and hard-working labour force with only a limited capacity for persistent militancy.
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In Table 4 
Strategies of conflict regulation and the post-1973 crises
The relationships between dominant modes of conflict strategies and the development of unemployment in our eighteen countries during the 1973-86 period can be only briefly sketched here. On the whole the political or conflict-of-interest hypothesis can generate plausible accounts of the differences in unemployment between the countries (see Table 5 Source: see the Appendix.
to allow major increases in unemployment, a de velopment which could have discredited this po litical tendency for a long time to come. In the 1980s, however, the Austrian socialists were un able to maintain unemployment at the earlier ve ry low levels.
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Among the societal bargaining countries we can discern some effects of the long-term political strength of the Left on labour market perform ance. Thus Austria, Norway and Sweden (with a politically strong Left) have lower levels of unem ployment than Finland, a country with a Left of medium strength. However in Switzerland the ex tremely low level of recorded unemployment does not fully reveal the contours of a class com promise involving a weak labour movement. Wheras in Norway, Sweden and Finland male la bour-force participation rates have been largely maintained and female rates have markedly in creased, in Switzerland full employment has been limited to the native male labour force, while a large proportion of foreign labour has been ex pelled and female labour-force participation has been frozen. 40 Similar tendencies, although much less marked, can also be observed in Austria and in Germany.
41
In Japan the first oil shock came when popular support for the ruling LDP was crumbling for the first time during the post-war period. So here, too, the government had a strong incentive, as well as the capacity, to avoid drastic increases in unemployment.
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Male participation rates have been relatively stable, while female rates have in creased less than in most other countries.
Among the pluralist countries, left-wing gov ernments (with much weaker political support than those in Sweden, Norway and Austria) failed in their efforts to maintain full employ ment, while centrist and conservative govern ments also permitted a high unemployment level. Thus all major government alternatives were dis credited on the issue of full employment, which therefore may have come to be seen as unrealistic by voters. In these countries, male labour-force participation has decreased considerably, while female rates have increased in varying degrees. In the United States, Canada and Denmark, howev er, male rates have been largely maintained while female rates have markedly increased.
Labour market institutions
In the political interpretation of unemployment proposed here, labour market institutions and wage-setting procedures appear as intervening variables, which mediate the effects from, and are affected by, the distribution of power resources.
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'Neo-corporatist' explanations of unemployment, however, do accord central roles to labour mar ket institutions and wage-setting procedures as independent variables. 44 The interest in neo-corporatism signifies a potentially valuable attention to the role of institutions for labour market per formance. 45 The various rankings of countries ac cording to degree of neocorporatism may per haps tap something of relevance for unemploy ment. Thus, while Austria, Norway and Sweden, which in the power resources perspective are characterized by societal bargaining resulting from politically strong labour movements, are usually classified as highly neo-corporatist, the Netherlands as well as Germany, Belgium and Denmark also tend to be regarded as neo-corpo ratist and this has not prevented them from ac cepting high levels of unemployment. On the oth er hand, Finland and Switzerland, with low levels oft unemployment, are generally not seen as neocorporatist. It has also been very difficult to fit Japan into a unidimensional scale of neo-corpo ratism.
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The approach proposed here suggests that while institutions on the labour market to some extent have constrained policy choices, their role in this context has been limited.
Discussion
Against the background of the 1920s and 1930s, the present rates of unemployment in the West ern nations do not appear as anomalous. In a his torical perspective it is instead the rise and de mise of full employment during the post-war dec ades that cries out for an explanation. We have here contrasted a market-oriented, neo-classical economic approach with a conflict-oriented polit ical approach in attempts to explain these turning points of the long waves of unemployment as well as the remaining variations in unemployment in the eighteen countries.
The neo-classical view that unemployment is a result of the raising of the price of labour above its warranted level can contribute only a little to the explanation of the reversals of the long waves of unemployment and its variation between coun tries. Claims made by some academic scholars as well as by the OEOD that the supply shock and real wage gap hypothesis can explain the post-197^ upsurge of unemployment turn out to be largely based on an incorrect specification of the models to be tested. The widely use 'Eurosclerosis' interprestation based on contrasts in la bour market performance between Europe on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other fails to account for the considerable var iations in unemployment among European coun tries as well as for the contrasting post-war histo ries of unemployment in Japan and the United States.
Furthermore the wage gap hypothesis comes close to making the assumption that it is possible, in some objective sense, to determine the 'war ranted' level of wage increases, and thereby the functional distribution of income between profits and wages. This approach thus tends to define away basic conflicts of interest in Western socie ties. Alternatively, this approach assumes that the functional distribution of income should re main stable over time, and then overlooks the fact that in the past it has changed considerably without obvious repercussions on unemploy ment. Therefore this economic approach must be complemented by a conflict or political approach.
The conflict-oriented political approach recog nizes that while economic power resources are unequally distributed between socio-economically defined interest groups, political power re sources are less unequally distributed, something which tends to create tensions between markets and politics in Western societies. Distributive strife finds its expression in areas such as industri al disputes, inflation and the determination of un employment levels. In a long-term perspective one of the most salient political changes in West ern societies during the twentieth century has been the gradual strengthening of left-wing par ties and labour unions, and their dramatic move in the years following the Second World War from the fringes to the centre of the political scene. I have argued that this underlying change in the distribution of power resources between the main interest groups has affected the intensity and forms of distributive strife, changing the character of industrial conflicts, bringing inflation into a key role and making variations in unem ployment both a means and an outcome of these conflicts.
The conflict-oriented political hypothesis as sumes that the relative strength of left-wing polit ical parties is of importance for the development --of conflict strategies and for policy-making about unemployment. Contrary to what is often done, however, in the testing of this hypothesis we must not only apply causal but also intentional analy sis. Thus, in addition to the direct, 'transmission belt' type of effects studied in the conventional causal approach, we must consider indirect ef fects of partisan politics generated by strategic ac tion in varying contexts of party competition, where shifting distributions of power resources, the credibility of different policy alternatives, as well as institutional structures are of significance. Because of data limitations it is not possible here to subject this political hypothesis to an elegant formal empirical test. Analyses and data adduced here would, however, appear to give plausible ac counts of the turning points of the two latest long waves of unemployment. This approach can also largely account for the generally ignored varia tion in unemployment between countries during the Golden Age as well as the post-1973 period. For those viewing the Western democracies as societies in basic harmony, where free competi tion countributes to the welfare of all, the con flict-of-interest interpretation of the post-1973 in crease in unemployment may suggest a conspir acy. However, as the OECD has amply documented, influential policy-makers saw the prevailing full employment as causing wage in flation as well as a profit squeeze some time be fore the first oil shock. The conflict-of-interest hypothesis only implies that in the face of the se vere economic disturbances generated by the oil shocks, some governments have been less than maximally engaged in the complicated efforts to maintain full employment. This became politi cally possible since the oil shocks made increased unemployment appear more as a natural disaster than a deliberate government policy.
I am not postulating a linear relationship be tween left-wing strength and unemployment. In stead, historical and national circumstances form the stage for the development of modes-of-con-flict regulations, party competition and strategic action which affect levels of unemployment. Up to 1973 party competition generated near full employment in all but those countries where the Left was not a realistic government alternative. After the oilshocks, when unemployment was more frequently seen as the result of international developments rather than of national policies, near to full employment could be maintained only in the few countries, apart from Japan, where the Left had traditionally formed majority governments or where constitutions gave minority parties a strong leverage in coalition governments.
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The hysteresis interpretation of the persistence of unemployment gives it the character of inertia, yet, as we have seen, during the years after the Second World War it was possible in most countries to break the vicious circle of unemployment. In the late 1980s, however, among the pluralist countries, unemployment had receded to its -in this case relatively high -pre-1973 level only in the United States. This difference between the pluralist countries can be interpreted in terms of the conflict-of-interest hypothesis. In the United States the Left in the European sense is weak and in recent decades unionization has decreased to the extent that the US labour market is now practically non-unionized. This situation has generated a high degree of real wage flexibility, whereas in Europe wage earners have been better able to cushion themselves against inflation. In contrast to Europe, in the United States the need to maintain a very high level of unemployment to counteract wage increases would therefore appear to be lower. While economic factors clearly put constraints on policy making, the analysis here indicates that power distributions and partisan politics have been of significance for policy making in relation to unemployment. The political factors, however, have not only or primarily worked through 'transmission belt' processes but rather by affecting the conditions for party competition as well as the alternative forms which distributive conflicts take in Western societies. 
Notes
